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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. The property dispute arose from the placement,
more than 40 years ago, of a fence too far on to the
defendant’s property. The plaintiff had maintained the
fence for over 30 years and the parties or their predecessors
had recognized the fence as the boundary between the two
properties. The defendant argued that the doctrine of
acquiescence of a fence did not apply because the fence did
not fully enclose the disputed property. The evidence
demonstrated that a gap existed at the end of the fence
when a creek receded during dry months but that the fence
reached the water in wet months. The court held that the
natural boundary of the creek would be included to
determine whether the fence completely enclosed the
disputed property and upheld the trial court award of title to
the disputed property to the plaintiff. Lindgren v. Martin,
949 P.2d 1061 (Idaho 1997).
ANIMALS
DOGS. The defendant county had ordered the plaintiff’s
dog to be destroyed under Or. Stat. § 609.155(3)(a) because
the dog had chased a horse owned by a third party in the
third party’s pasture. There was no evidence that the horse
was injured or that the dog had attempted to harm the
horse. The plaintiff argued that the statute required proof of
injury or intent to injure. The court held that the statute was
clear that merely chasing livestock was an action that
required that the dog be put to death. Roach v. Jackson
County, 949 P.2d 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The debtors filed for
Chapter 7 in December 1995 and claimed their 1995 earned
income tax credit as exempt under Okla. Stat. tit. 31, §
1(A)(19) which allowed an exemption for “alimony,
support, separate maintenance or child support payments to
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of such
person and any dependent of such person.” The court noted
that such payments usually result from a divorce decree but
that the statute did not restrict the exemption to divorce
decree payments. The court held that the purpose of the
earned income tax credit was the support of families with
children and allowed the exemption. In re George, 98-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,588 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor was of advanced age and
poor health. Three years before filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor moved to a nursing home but had since moved in
with a daughter who provided medical care. The debtor’s
other two daughters lived in the debtor’s residence. The
debtor argued that the residence still was eligible for the
homestead exemption because the debtor’s absence from
the residence was involuntary, due to poor health and need
of care. The court held that the evidence did not
demonstrate any necessity that the debtor move out of the
residence but only that it was more convenient for the
daughter who cared for the debtor. The court also noted
that the eligibility for the exemption relied more on
physical presence than personal intent and held that the
residence was not eligible for the exemption. Matter of
Burns, 218 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998).
The debtor owned a 42 acre property on which the
debtor’s residence was located. The property was located
within city limits and city sewer and water hookups were
available to the property but not used. The city provided
fire and police protection for the property. The property
was surrounded by residential subdivisions and the
property was zoned for residential use. The court held that
the property was an urban homestead, limited to an
exemption of one acre. Matter of Crowell, 138 F.3d 1031
(5th Cir. 1998).
    Chapter 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN INTEREST. This ruling involved two unrelated
Chapter 12 cases in which the Bankruptcy Court had set an
interest rate on payments on secured claims as equal to the
rate for U.S. Treasury instruments of similar duration. The
cases were appealed but sent back to the Bankruptcy Court
in light of new decisions. During the appeals in these cases,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided In re Valenti,
105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997), which held that the basic
interest rate should not have any factor for a “coerced loan”
aspect of the plan payments. However, Valenti, held that
the interest rate should be adjusted for a risk of default
factor. The issue was further affected by the holding in
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879
(1997), which held that any risk factor was to be included
in the value of the claim before the interest rate was
determined. The Bankruptcy Court held that the U.S.
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Treasury instruments’ interest rate without any adjustments
was appropriate in this case because the claim was
oversecured. The Supreme Court in Rash stated that the
“replacement value standard accurately gauges the debtor’s
use of the property” in cases where the debtor retains the
collateral for a secured claim; therefore, no additional
compensation was required from an increased interest rate
on payments of the claim. In re Goodyear, 218 B.R. 718
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1998).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
NET OPERATING LOSSES. Five months before filing
for Chapter 7 in March 1995, the debtor filed the income
tax return for 1993 and made the election to carry forward
all net operating losses (NOLs) in that year. If the NOLs
had been carried back, the debtor would have been entitled
to over $200,000 in refunds, far more than if the NOLs
were carried forward. The Chapter 7 trustee filed income
tax returns for the estate and claimed a refund based on the
carry back of the NOLs. When the IRS disallowed the
carrybacks, the trustee sought avoidance of the NOL
election by the debtor as a fraudulent transfer. The court
held that (1) the NOL election was a transfer, (2) NOLs are
an interest in property of the debtor, (3) the election was a
fraudulent transfer because the debtor did not receive a
reasonably equivalent value for the election and the debtor
was insolvent at the time of the election. The court also
held that the transfer of tax attributes under I.R.C. § 1398
did not restrict the trustee’s avoidance powers under
Section 548. Therefore, the court held that the NOL
election could be avoided by the trustee in favor of
allowing the trustee to carry the NOLs back to earlier tax
years. In re Feiler, 218 B.R. 957 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998).
POST-PETITION INTEREST. The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 and had nondischargeable tax claims remaining
at the end of the case. The IRS sought interest on the claims
from the date of the bankruptcy petition. The court held
that post-petition interest on nondischargeable tax claims
was also nondischargeable. In the Matter of Johnson, 98-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,552 (5th Cir. 1998).
CONTRACTS
AGISTER CONTRACT. The plaintiff had pastured
cattle on the defendant’s land for several years. After the
defendant moved to other property, the parties agreed to
allow the plaintiff to continue to pasture the cattle on the
defendant’s land but the plaintiff hired a third party to care
for the cattle while they were on the defendant’s land. In
one year, 116 cattle became sick from eating vegetation
contaminated by chemicals on the defendant’s land which
were not known by either party to be there. The plaintiff
alleged an oral agister’s contract and claimed the loss of the
cattle was a breach of the contract. The court held that no
bailment contract was proved because there was no
evidence that the defendant or the defendant’s agent
accepted possession and control of the cattle. The court
held that the caretaker was not shown to be an agent of the
defendant and was more likely an agent of the plaintiff.
Hoye v. Like, 958 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final
amendments to the brucellosis regulations concerning the
interstate movement of cattle by changing the classification
of Alabama from Class A to Class Free. 63 Fed. Reg.
37243 (July 10, 1998).
BORROWER’S RIGHTS. The plaintiffs, husband and
wife, defaulted on loans from the FmHA, now the FSA,
and the FmHA foreclosed on the plaintiffs’ farm. The
FmHA sent notice to the plaintiffs of their rights to
leaseback the residential portion of the property but the
plaintiffs refused. The FmHA held the property for several
years and then placed the farm for sale, giving the plaintiffs
37 days notice of the sale. The sale was made at auction to
a third party and no right of first purchase at the sales price
was given to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that the
failure to give them information about exercising their right
of first chance to purchase the property at the sale price was
a violation of 7 U.S.C. § 1985(e)(1)(C). The FmHA argued
that the plaintiffs’ rights expired 180 days after the FmHA
purchased the property or when the plaintiffs refused to
leaseback the residence. The court held that the plaintiffs’
right of first purchase was not affected by the leaseback
program and that Section 1985(e) required reasonable
notice of the right to the plaintiffs before the 180 period
began. The court ordered the FSA to reissue notice of the
plaintiffs’ right and allow the plaintiffs 60 days to obtain
sufficient financing to purchase the farm at the sales price.
Velarde v. United States, 992 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Colo.
1998).
CROP INSURANCE. FCIC has issued proposed
amendments to the Common Crop Insurance Regulations
effective for the 1999 and succeeding crop years. The only
change to the provisions for insuring guaranteed production
plan of fresh market tomatoes is to change the calendar date
for the end of the insurance period for certain states. The
end of the insurance period for Delaware, Maryland, New
Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia will be changed from
September 20 to October 15 of the crop year. The end of
the insurance period for Florida, Georgia, and South
Carolina will be changed from September 20 to November
10 of the crop year. The FCIC determined that a September
20 ending date created an insurance period that was too
short in these states. The FCIC also found that, under the
current crop provisions, if the crop is planted during the fall
planting period in accordance with the special provisions in
effect for the 1999 crop year, the crop will not reach
maturity before the end of the insurance period. The
proposed change in the dates for the end of the insurance
period will allow for insurance coverage from the time of
planting until maturity of the crop. 63 Fed. Reg. 38761
(July 20, 1998).
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The FCIC has announced its approval for reinsurance and
subsidy for the insurance of wheat in select states and
counties under the Crop Revenue Coverage plan of
insurance for the 1999 crop year. The notice informs
eligible producers and the private insurance industry of the
CRC coverage changes for wheat and provide its terms and
conditions. 63 Fed. Reg. 37829 (July 14, 1998).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. The
decedent and surviving spouse had created a trust and
transferred investment real properties to the trust. The trust
was a grantor trust under I.R.C. § 671. After funding the
trust, the decedent and spouse, as trustees of the trust,
intended to exchange the properties in the trust for like-
kind properties in separate exchanges that qualified for
nonrecognition treatment under §1031. The decedent and
spouse entered into an exchange agreement with a bank and
separately sold each of the properties in the trust. At the
time of the decedent’s death, the decedent and spouse had
identified one replacement property and entered into a
contract to purchase the replacement property. However,
the second replacement property had not yet been identified
at the time of the decedent's death. The exchanges were
then completed after the decedent’s death by identifying
and acquiring the second replacement property and
acquiring the first replacement property. The IRS ruled
that, because the exchange of properties qualified under
Section 1031, the proceeds from the exchange of the
properties attributable to the decedent’s interest in the
properties did not constitute a right to receive an item of
income in respect of decedent under I.R.C. § 691. In
addition, because (1) the decedent was treated as owning a
share of the trust property at the time of death, and (2) the
exchange qualified for nonrecognition treatment under
§1031, the decedent was treated as owning one-half share
of the replacement properties 1 and 2 at the time of death.
Accordingly, the decedent was entitled to a basis
adjustment for the replacement properties under both I.R.C
§§ 1014(a), 1014(b)(6). Ltr. Rul. 9829025, April 17, 1998.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX. The
decedent's estate timely filed its estate tax return on
December 21, 1978. The estate properly elected under
I.R.C. § 6166 to defer the payment of a portion of its estate
tax liability attributable to an interest in a closely held
business. Under this election, for the first four years
following the original due date for the tax, the estate made
annual payments of interest only. For the following ten
years, it timely made combined annual payments of the tax,
plus additional accrued interest. The final installment
payment was received by the IRS on December 23, 1993.
The estate filed a claim for refund on December 12, 1995,
requesting a refund of interest paid between December
1982 and December 1993 as well as other administration
expenses from its tax years 1986 through 1996. The estate
did not follow the procedure in Rev. Proc. 81-27, 1981-2
C.B. 548 or file a protective claim for refund. Rather, the
estate paid the full amount of each installment and did not
file any supplemental Forms 706 to claim deductions for
interest or other expenses of administration. Nearly two
years after the final installment was paid, the estate filed a
claim for refund that claimed a deduction for interest and
other administration expenses paid throughout the entire
ten year installment payment period. The IRS
acknowledged that the taxpayer overpaid the estate tax and
interest. However, pursuant to the limitation imposed by
I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(B), the IRS ruled that a refund claim is
limited to the amount paid within two years of the date the
claim was filed. Accordingly, the IRS refunded only the
amount paid in the last installment, which was the amount
paid within the two years preceding the claim for refund.
Ltr. Rul. 9828002, March 9, 1998.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent operated
an incorporated business but the decedent’s stock was
owned by the decedent’s sister-in-law in order to keep the
stock from the decedent’s creditors. The stock was
transferred to a trust for the benefit of the decedent. The
trustee was the decedent’s nephew and the trust had a
spendthrift clause preventing the decedent from transferring
or assigning any interest in the trust assets. The decedent’s
estate sought to treat the stock as part of the decedent’s
gross estate in order to increase the basis of the stock to
reduce the gain from the post-death sale of the stock. The
IRS ruled that the stock was not included in the decedent’s
gross estate because the decedent did not have any power
of appointment in the stock. The estate argued that the
decedent actually disregarded the trust and treated the stock
as the decedent’s property. The court held that the trust
provisions were clear and unambiguous that the decedent
had no right to transfer or assign the stock; therefore, the
stock was not included in the decedent’s estate and did not
receive an increase in basis at death. Pitt v. United States,
98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,314 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
VALUATION. The taxpayer owned land, consisting of
five separate adjacent unsurveyed lots. Four of the lots are
completely wooded and the taxpayer planed to transfer the
fifth lot to a trust.  The property was characterized as a
single parcel of real property on the tax map and was
assessed as a unit for property tax purposes. A three acre
portion of the property contained a residential dwelling and
a barn which was used for storage. About one-half of the
property consisted of "backland" with steep grades
unsuitable for development. The property was located in a
town, which was characterized as a small bedroom
community. The town was zoned only for residential use,
and commercial use was permitted only by special
variance. The neighborhood in which the property is
located is rural in nature, the majority of the landowners in
the neighborhood are large landowners, and the properties
are used for residential purposes. The taxpayer used the
dwelling as a vacation home and never rented any part of
the property to anyone. The IRS ruled that the property was
a qualified personal residence under I.R.C. § 2702. Ltr.
Rul. 9829026, April 17, 1998.
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FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayers,
husband and wife, had 10 children. The taxpayers filed
their income tax return, claiming only regular income and
regular tax on that income. The taxpayers had medical
expenses in excess of 10 percent of AGI and claimed
deductions for state and local taxes and $29,400 in personal
exemptions. The IRS assessed a deficiency based on a
determination that alternative minimum tax was owed,
resulting from the large medical deduction, state and local
tax deduction and personal exemptions. The taxpayers had
not claimed any tax preference items as a deduction. The
taxpayers argued that application of the alternative
minimum tax adversely affected large families, contrary to
congressional intent. The court held that the statute was
clear as to the AMT requirements and the statute was the
best indication of congressional intent. Klaassen v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-241.
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer was the sole owner of an S
corporation and loaned the corporation money which was
carried as a loan on the corporation’s books. The taxpayer
was the chairman of the board but not an employee of the
corporation. The taxpayer claimed a business bad debt
deduction but the IRS characterized the deduction as a
nonbusiness bad debt. The court held that the bad debts
were nonbusiness bad debts because the taxpayer failed to
show that the loans were made to protect the taxpayer’s
employment with the corporation. Kaiser v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-264.
EMPLOYEE MEALS. The IRS ruled that a casino
could exclude the cost of meals provided for its employees
if the onsite eating facility was reasonably believed to be a
de minimis eating facility and at least 90 percent of the
meals were either (1) excludible under I.R.C. § 119 or (2)
reasonably expected to be excludible under I.R.C. § 119.
Ltr. Rul. 9829001, March 10, 1998.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayers
purchased a farm which was enrolled in the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP). The taxpayers had to apply to the
USDA to take over the participation in the CRP from the
previous owners and the USDA ruled that the taxpayers
were actively engaged in the business of farming. The IRS,
however, assessed tax deficiencies based on disallowance
of deductions for farm expenses because the taxpayers were
not engaged in farming for a profit. The taxpayers
eventually won their appeal on that issue and sought
litigation fees from the IRS because the IRS position was
not substantially justified. The taxpayers argued that the
USDA finding was binding on the IRS. The court held that
the USDA finding was based on different criteria from
those used by the IRS. The court noted that the taxpayers
had not supplied the IRS with sufficient information to
make a full determination early and that factual issues
remained through most of the appeal process. Hasbrouck
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-249.
INCOME . The taxpayer had only wage income but
excluded from gross income amounts garnished to repay a
delinquent loan. The court held that garnished wages were
not excluded from gross income. Minor v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1998-237.
IRA. The IRS has announced that Form 5305-RB, Roth
Individual Retirement Annuity Endorsement, a new model
annuity endorsement agreement, has been published. A
Roth IRA is established after the contract, which includes
Form 5305-RB, is executed by both the annuitant and the
issuer. The form meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 408A.
The form is available by computer from the IRS internet
site (http://www.irs.ustreas.gov). Ann. 98-58, I.R.B. 1998-
28, 12.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. An S corporation merged with another
corporation which became a subsidiary of the S corporation
by having the shareholders transfer their stock to the new
corporation. The new corporation intended to file a QSSS
election but discovered that the election could cause the
corporations to lose the benefit of suspended losses;
therefore, the merger was dissolved with all stock returned
to the original owners. The corporation sought application
of the contract doctrine of rescission to apply to the tax
aspects of the transactions. The IRS ruled that Rev. Rul. 80-
58, 1980-1 C.B. 181 provided the rules for applying the
doctrine of rescission and ruled that the doctrine of
rescission would be applied to treat the transfer of stock as
never happening. Ltr. Rul. 9829044, April 21, 1998.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was an S corporation and had two
trusts as shareholders. The income beneficiaries of the
trusts made elections under I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2) to treat the
trusts as QSSTs. The income beneficiaries reported all
pass-through items of income, deduction, and credit
allocable to the shares of stock held by the trusts. All of the
shareholders, including the QSSTs, entered into an
agreement to sell all of their shares of stock to a publicly-
traded C corporation. As part of the stock purchase
agreement, the shareholders of the two corporations made
an election under I.R.C. § 338(h)(10). The S corporation
had gain from the deemed sale of the S corporation’s assets
resulting from the Section 338(h)(10) election. The IRS
ruled that the corporate gain from the deemed sale of the S
corporation’s assets resulting from the Section 338(h)(10)
election was recognized by the trusts and not the income
beneficiaries of the trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9828006, April 6,
1998.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. This case involved tax years
prior to the 1997 enactment of the provision excluding gain
from the sale of a residence. The taxpayer had filed for
bankruptcy and the taxpayer’s personal obligation on a
residential mortgage was discharged. The taxpayer sold the
residence and paid the mortgage. The taxpayer did not
purchase a replacement residence. The taxpayer calculated
the gain from the sale by excluding the mortgage amount
from the proceeds of the sale, arguing that the debt was
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discharged in bankruptcy. The court held that the full
proceeds of the sale were included in determining the gain
from the sale. Neighbors v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-
263.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
FERTILIZER. The plaintiff was a governmental
corporation which owned the World Trade Center and sued
in negligence and products liability the defendant fertilizer
manufacturer for damages resulting from use of the
defendant’s products in the bombing of the trade center.
The plaintiff argued that the ammonium nitrate produced
by the defendant was unreasonably dangerous and
defective in that the chemical was not produced in a
nonexplosive form available at the time. The court held that
the defendant was not liable for the bombing because the
actions of the persons who constructed the bomb were an
intervening cause of the bombing which were not
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. Port Authority of
N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 991 F. Supp. 390 (D.
N.J. 1997).
FRONT LOADER.  The plaintiff was injured while
using a tractor front loader to move round hay bales. The
loader was manufactured by the defendant but was not
equipped with an optional bale clamp. The plaintiff used a
homemade fork attachment. The plaintiff was injured when
a bale fell on the plaintiff when the loader raised up
accidentally, allowing the bale to fall back onto the tractor,
while the plaintiff was distracted by an obstruction behind
the tractor. There was no evidence that the loader controls
allowed the loader to rise by itself. The loader carried
warnings about the danger of using the loader to move hay
bales without the use of the clamp. The evidence also
showed that the plaintiff knew about the danger of
transporting bales without the clamp and had used similar
equipment to move bales with a clamp. The defendant
argued that it had no liability because the warnings were
adequate for the plaintiff, based on the plaintiff’s
experience. The court held that summary judgment for the
defendant was proper because the plaintiff demonstrated no
defect in the loader or the warnings which gave rise to the
accident. Delaney v. Deere & Co., 985 F. Supp. 1009 (D.
Kan. 1997).
PROPERTY
EASEMENT. The plaintiff had used a road over the
defendant’s property for many years as the only means of
reaching the plaintiff’s property from the nearest public
highway. The defendant complained that the plaintiff drove
too fast on the road and attempted to prevent the plaintiff’s
use of the road. The plaintiff sought a right to use the road,
either as a prescriptive easement or as a private road
resulting from strict necessity. The trial court had denied all
of the plaintiff’s claims. The appellate court agreed that no
prescriptive easement could be awarded because the
evidence showed that the plaintiff may have received
permission to use the road from the current and past owners
of the defendant’s land. However, the appellate court held
that, because the plaintiff had no other means of reaching
the plaintiff’s property, under Mo. Stat. § 228.342, a private
road should have been declared arising out of strict
necessity. The court noted that, although the plaintiff had
obtained permission to use a neighbor’s property to reach
the plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff did not have an
enforceable right to use the neighbor’s road. Spier v.
Brewer, 958 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
TRESPASS. The plaintiff was the owner of a rural
property which was subject to an easement along power
lines which gave the defendant rural electric cooperative
the right to enter the property and cut trees and branches
which could strike the power lines. The evidence
demonstrated that the defendant cut down over 300 trees,
many of which were in no danger of striking the power
lines. In addition, the defendant poisoned much of the
remaining trees and stumps. The plaintiff sought damages
for trespass, arguing that the defendant exceeded the rights
granted in the easement. The jury had reached a verdict for
the defendant. The appellate court reversed the jury verdict
as to the poisoned trees and as to trees which were not in
danger of striking the power lines. The court noted
testimony of agents of the defendant which admitted that
many trees were cut without authorization under the
easement. Murphy v. Fannin County Elec. Co-op., 957
S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
STATUTORY LIENS . The debtor had boarded an
Arabian horse with a stable. Upon filing for bankruptcy, the
debtor sought return of the horse as estate property, but the
stable refused to return the horse, claiming a security
interest in the horse for unpaid stable fees. Under Iowa
Code § 579.1, the stable had a statutory lien against the
horse for unpaid stable fees. The debtor argued that the
Section 579.1 lien required perfection by filing, because the
statute provided that Section 579 was subject to Section
579A (agister liens). The court held that the “subject to”
language in Section 579.1 applied only as to the priority of
the liens created by the two statutes. Therefore, the court
held that the stable fee lien was perfected and that transfer
of the horse to the debtor’s estate would first require a
determination of need for adequate protection. In re
Klemme, 218 B.R. 906 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1997).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Rapp v. Comm'r, 140 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
1998), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-10 (marital deduction) see
p. 53 supra.
Redlark v. Comm'r, 141 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 1998),
rev’g,  106 T.C. 31 (1996) (interest) see p. 62 supra.
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3d Annual
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 4-8, 1999
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1999! Balmy trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand
beaches and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 4-8,
1999 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with a
continental breakfast and break refreshments included in the registration fee.  Each participant will
receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 430 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated
Materials which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business
deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to
minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and
"hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales,
private annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts
.  • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights
at a busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the
Royal Waikoloan Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the
Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is
$695.
Subscribers should have received a brochure in the mail.
Call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 if you have not yeet received one.
